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1. Introduction 
In this article, I address some problems that parentheticals, a group of formally 
dissimilar but functionally uniform linguistic expressions, pose for a seman-
tic/pragmatic analysis. On the basis of the empirical data drawn from English 
and Polish (for comparison and to verify the theoretical claims), I re-examine 
the semantic/pragmatic properties of parentheticals and approach them from 
a relevance-theoretic perspective that introduces the distinction between con-
ceptual and procedural meaning that linguistic expressions, parentheticals 
included, may potentially encode. I also investigate whether a relevance-the-
oretic account of parentheticals may help in a better understanding of paren-
theticals as a class of linguistic expressions and how it may clarify their status 
in linguistic analysis and theory.
2. Parentheticals in linguistic research: the state of the art
Linguistic communication is peppered with parentheticals. Whether in speech 
or writing, utterances are frequently interrupted by more or less complex par-
enthetical expressions, typically occurring in the middle of a linguistic struc-
ture (referred to as its host), “unintegrated in the sense that [they] could be 
omitted without aff ecting the rest of that structure or its meaning” (Biber et 
al. 1999: 1067), marked by punctuation (commas, parentheses/brackets, or 
dashes) in texts, and set off  by comma intonation in speech.
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With the defi nition formulated as above, parenthetical functions as an um-
brella term for a wide spectrum of linguistic expressions and may include, 
among others, the following:1
(1)  Th e driver of Al-Kindi’s only remaining ambulance – the other three had 
been stolen or looted – has disappeared. So the dangerously ill Mr Khas-
sem was bundled into a clapped-out rust-bitten Moskvich 408 (Blakemore 
2006: 1671).
(2)  A helicopter, a helicopter – and there was me who’d never even fl own in an 
ordinary plane – would come and pick me up at … (Blakemore 2009: 11)
(3)  What is obvious – and we have eye-witness reports – is that they were killed 
(Blakemore 2009: 11).
(4)  Margaret Wynne Nevinson, an active feminist, who was a member of 
a school management committee for twenty-fi ve years and who also served 
as a Poor Law Guardian, found her fellow male Guardians actively hostile.2 
(5)  Margaret Wynne Nevinson, an active feminist, who was a member of 
a school management committee for twenty-fi ve years and who also served 
as a Poor Law Guardian, found her fellow male Guardians actively hostile.3 
(6)  In fact, if you really want to know, I think of you as a very attractive man.
(7)  You’ll need lots of patience, but as you say your boy has a good nature oth-
erwise, the chances are you’ll succeed.
(8) It is, aft er all, what we brought you here for – to resolve our problems for 
us.
(9)  Th e colleges of South Kensington were involved in this along with other 
groups which, unfortunately, are passed over in this account.
Th ough intuitively and relatively easily recognized in utterances, parenthet-
icals have proved to be a challenge for linguistic theory, where they have been 
analyzed from various perspectives: syntactic, semantic/pragmatic, or prosod-
ic. As a result the studies available are hardly comparable and usually focus on 
diff erent sets of phenomena. Th ere is neither agreement in the literature on the 
criteria determining parenthetical status, nor consistent terminology used in 
reference to parenthesis.
Semantic/pragmatic studies are no exception, as there is no consensus in 
semantic/pragmatic theory on how the contribution of parenthetical expres-
1 Parentheticals are given in italics and represent both written and spoken sources.
2 Th e English examples provided here are from the British National Corpus (http://www.
natcorp.ox.ac.uk/), unless specifi ed otherwise.
3 In fact, it seems justifi ed to claim that the entire: ‘an active feminist, who was a member 
of a school management committee for twenty-fi ve years and who also served as a Poor Law 
Guardian’ can be considered parenthetical. More than one parenthetical can be associated with 
a single sentential structure (Espinal 1991).
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sions to utterance interpretation and their discourse function should be best 
approached.
In the traditional speech-act accounts, it has been generally assumed that 
parenthetical expressions have no propositional meaning, i.e., they do not in-
teract semantically with the utterance they are embedded in and do not aff ect 
the proposition expressed by the host. Rather, they indicate its illocutionary 
force (Urmson 1952), and comment on the main proposition. As stage-direc-
tions of some sort, parentheticals function as signals to guide the hearer to 
a proper appreciation of the host. 
Th e traditional speech-act approach to parenthetical insertions stands in 
contrast to the perspectives taken by linguists analyzing language as a form of 
social interaction, where parentheticals are taken to be examples of disfl uency 
characterizing unplanned discourse. In such approaches, as Wichmann (2001: 
189) puts it, parentheticals are nothing but:
hesitations, revisions and self corrections, incidental comments about what is be-
ing said in the host utterance, self-addressed questions and reminders, responses to 
something external to the conversation, and questions designed to elicit feedback 
or to check attention and as such, they are evidence that speakers have trouble 
planning their utterances, but are constrained by interactional principle to keep 
talking.
However, the discourse/pragmatic integration of the parenthetical with the 
host utterance or the lack thereof does not seem to be the only concern for 
parenthetical description in semantic/pragmatic studies. Given the existence 
of pragmatic links between the parenthetical and its host, it seems desirable to 
specify the range of their pragmatic functions. Th e problem is that, as already 
suggested, like other pragmatic markers, parentheticals can have any number 
of functions depending on the context and moreover, these functions may 
sometimes overlap. In consequence, it is not easy to reduce parentheticals to 
a single pragmatic meaning (Rouchota 1996, 1998). Bolinger (1989: 190), for 
instance, lists three main relationships that a parenthetical can have with refer-
ence to its host, which he classifi es as:
• comments (oft en providing additional information or aft erthought), e.g., 
I think, I mean, I believe; 
• revisions, e.g., or, that is, rather; 
• decisions e.g., like, well, let’s say.
Th us, although it is traditionally assumed that there is a class of expres-
sions that can be grouped together as parentheticals, intuition is oft en relied on 
when deciding what to include in the parenthetical class. Indeed, classifi cation 
is not an easy task, taking into consideration the fact that when a parenthetical 
is taken independently of its host utterance, there is no single criterion which 
can be chosen to identify it.
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In view of this, pragmatic research on parentheticals has two main goals: 
fi rstly to explain the use of parentheticals in actual discourse where paren-
thetical insertion seems to be to be a performance phenomenon, constituting 
disfl uency typical of unplanned discourse and marked by special prosody, as 
in the examples in (1)‒(3), and secondly to account for a class of parenthetical 
constructions intervening within a clause which are realized with the same 
comma intonation, presumably hold similar discourse functions, but which 
are taken to be licensed by grammar, as in the examples in (4)‒(9). 
Last but not least, since present-day linguistic research is characterized by 
broadening of the fi eld to include new phenomena and there is more interest 
in constructions which are less prototypical, the defi nition of a parenthetical in 
terms of lack of syntactic, semantic and prosodic integration is not satisfactory. It 
has been shown that certain syntactic relations between the parenthetical and its 
host do exist: e.g., some binding eff ects and scope relations can be observed be-
tween the parenthetical and the host (Dehé and Kavalova 2007: 4). Furthermore, 
it has been argued, most notably by Blakemore (2006, 2009), that parentheti-
cals do have propositional meaning and may contribute to the interpretation 
of the utterance they are embedded in by altering the context for its interpreta-
tion, which puts the non-truth conditionality of parentheticals in question. Fi-
nally, any of the important prosodic features can be suspended depending on the 
function of the parenthetical, its length and position (Bolinger 1989; Dehé and 
Wichmann 2010; Kaltenböck 2008, a.o.). Th is suggests that none of the features 
traditionally linked with parenthesis qualifi es as a necessary condition.
Th us, the pragmatic function(s) that parentheticals can have with respect 
to their host utterances emerge(s) as the only one positive and reliable feature 
characterizing this class of linguistic expressions. Th erefore the semantic/prag-
matic relationship between the parenthetical and the host is worth re-inves-
tigating with a view to fi nding the ground for a unifi ed pragmatic account of 
parenthetical phenomena.
3. Parentheticals in semantics and pragmatics: (non-)truth 
conditional meaning vs. non-unitary theory of semantics
As already mentioned, in the traditional speech-act accounts of parenthetical 
phenomena, their semantics has been explained in terms of non-truth condi-
tional meaning. In this section, I focus on the meaning of parentheticals and 
the way they might contribute to utterance interpretation from a relevance-
theoretic perspective, and more specifi cally, a non-unitary theory of semantics 
proposed by Blakemore (1987, 2006, 2009). Th is approach is discussed with 
respect to empirical data from English and Polish to see whether it has any 
71
The Pragmatics of Parenthetical Constructions: Evidence from English and Polish 
advantages over the traditional speech-act account and whether it might help 
clarify the semantic/pragmatic properties of parentheticals.
3.1. Non-truth conditional meaning
As observed by Grice (1989: 362), in the sentence such as (10) below, the 
meaning of the phrase ‘on the other hand’ diff ers from the meaning of phrases 
such as ‘brother-in-law’ or ‘great aunt.’ ‘On the other hand’ does not have a rep-
resentational meaning, i.e., the meaning that encodes a concept and is part of 
the proposition expressed in the utterance, unlike ‘brother-in-law’ and ‘great 
aunt.’ Rather, it shows that the proposition should be taken as a comment, in 
this case of the contrastive type, on the propositional content of the utterance, 
thus constraining its context of interpretation:
My brother-in-law lives on a peak in Darien; his great aunt, on the other hand, was 
a nurse in World War I (Grice 1989: 362).
Similarly to the contrastive ‘on the other hand,’ the parenthetical expres-
sions ‘I think’ and ‘you know’ in (11) represent what Grice referred to as high-
er-level speech-acts in the function of comments (showing how the speaker 
is committed to the proposition expressed in the utterance) on lower-order 
speech-acts:
(11) a.  Th at was a nice picture – Marie liked it, I think, cos she didn’t mind me 
sticking it on the wall.
        b.  He is one of those players you want on your side because you know he 
will be superb week-in, week-out.
However, as Ifantidou (1994, 2001) convincingly argues, being parentheti-
cal is not a necessary condition for being non-truth conditional. In the exam-
ples below, the inserted expressions fi t the defi nition of a parenthetical given 
above. Yet the parenthetical use of ‘you say’ in (12) contributes to the truth 
conditions of the proposition expressed in the utterance since the speaker will 
be understood to be committed to (13a) but not to (13b):
(12)  Because John is, you say, a spy, we should be careful what we say to him 
(Ifantidou 2001: 149).
(13)  a. We should be careful what we say to John because you say he is a spy.
 b. We should be careful what we say to John because he is a spy.
Th e examples shown above can be further compared to the ones in (14), 
which present the contrast fi rst observed by Quirk et al. (1985): (14b), unlike 
(14a), does not have the same truth conditions as the sentence ‘George is a liar’:
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(14)  a. George is, as you said, a liar (*but I don’t believe it).4 
 b. George is, you say, a liar (but I don’t believe it).
Th e solution to the problem of the non-truth conditionality of parentheti-
cals off ered by Ifantidou (2001) builds on a hypothesis off ered to this prob-
lem by Wilson and Sperber (1993). Simply put, the use of ‘you say’ marks the 
proposition expressed by the host clause as a proposition which is relevant as 
a representation of a thought which is not the speaker’s, i.e., it is an example 
of interpretive use (cf. also Sperber and Wilson 1995). As such, it will not be 
understood as the expression of the speaker’s commitment to the proposition 
but rather as indicating that the proposition is a faithful representation of an-
other thought, i.e., the thought of the hearer. According to Sperber and Wilson 
(1995), the relationship between the proposition expressed and its interpreta-
tion is not that of identity but resemblance of content. In fact, the speaker in 
(14b) might be expressing any of the following propositions:
(15)  a. George never tells the truth.
 b. Whatever George has told you will be a lie.
 c. You should never believe what George says.
Th us, if the speaker using ‘you say’ as an example of interpretive use does 
not express his/her own commitment to the proposition, the inserted material 
will aff ect the truth conditions of the host. In (14a), on the other hand, the 
use of ‘as you said’ will be understood as the representation of the speaker’s 
thoughts. Th is suggests that ‘as you said’ is not truth-conditional in this case. 
Ifantidou (2001) draws a distinction between parentheticals which do not af-
fect truth-conditional content and those that do by marking it as a case of 
interpretive use or by aff ecting the strength of the proposition expressed. She 
does so with the help of two concepts: procedural and conceptual meaning, 
fi rst introduced into the theory of semantics by Blakemore (1987).
3.2. Conceptual vs. procedural meaning
According to both Blakemore (1987) and Wilson and Sperber (1993), elements 
with conceptual meaning are said to contribute to the content of assertions and 
are analyzed as encoding elements of conceptual representations. Procedural 
elements, on the other hand, encode information about how these representa-
tions are to be used in inference, how these representations should be taken. In 
other words, while the former contribute directly to the construction of concep-
tual representations, i.e., concepts, the latter indicate how to manipulate these 
representations, i.e., procedures in communication, which on the RT approach, 
4 Th e denial in (14a) is inconsistent, as the ‘as’-clause implicates the truth of its content.
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is an inferential process. What is of vital importance, however, is the question 
whether the recognition of two types of meaning may help in a better under-
standing and description of parenthetical phenomena. What is more, it might 
be worth exploring if these generalizations carry over to other languages.
4. Discourse parentheticals and their pragmatic 
interpretation
Th e parentheticals in the examples given in (1)‒(3) have never been analyzed 
as grammatically integrated into the host structure. However, following Blake-
more (2006: 1684‒85), the relationship between the parenthetical and its host 
in such examples can be captured by claiming that the parentheticals achieve 
relevance by contributing their own cognitive eff ects to the utterance interpre-
tation, but in the context of assumptions made accessible by the interpretation 
of the host.
For example, in the English example (1) repeated below as (16) and in the 
Polish example in (17), the parenthetical and the host are related at the level 
of pragmatic interpretation. Each is interpreted as having its own relevance 
and the parenthetical does not contribute to a combined proposition whose 
relevance is greater than that of the parenthetical and host taken individually. 
However, as Blakemore (2009: 11) argues, the parenthetical is not completely 
sealed off  from the truth conditional content of the host. Its relevance rests on 
the information about the truth conditional content of its host. Th us, the par-
enthetical identifi es the conceptual content of the host but it does not aff ect its 
implicit or explicit content:
(16)  Th e driver of Al Kindi’s only remaining ambulance – the other three had 
been stolen or looted – had disappeared. So the dangerously ill Mr Khas-
sem was bundled into a clapped-out rust bitten Moskvich 408 (Blake-
more 2006: 1671).
(17)  W prezydium Komisji Kultury zasiadał wówczas pan poseł Wełnicki – 
nie pamiętam imienia – sympatyczny skądinąd człowiek, który swoją 
rolę w tej komisji sprowadzał właściwie do odbijania telewizji publicz-
nej, jak sądził, z jednego ugrupowania do AWS i tym się tylko w czasie 
obrad tej komisji – albo przede wszystkim tym się zajmował.5
 ‘Th e Culture Committee was chaired by MP Wełnicki – I don’t remem-
ber his fi rst name – otherwise a nice man, who actually limited his 
5 Th e Polish examples provided here are from the Narodowy Korpus Języka Polskiego IPI 
PAN (http://nkjp.pl/), unless specifi ed otherwise.
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 actions to retaking national television, as he thought, from one political 
party to the AWS party and it was the only thing – or the main thing he 
was concerned with.’
Th e parentheticals are pragmatically integrated with the host in the sense 
that they provide the answers to the question raised by the hosts (‘Why was 
there only one ambulance?’ in the English example and: ‘Why is the person, 
the head of the national culture committee, referred to only by his surname?’ 
in the Polish example). Th e relevance of the coordinated proposition is not 
greater than each of the conjuncts taken individually. Th is fact is supported 
by the impossibility of using ‘and’ to communicate pragmatic integration (cf. 
Blakemore and Carston 2005):
(18)  ?? Th e driver of Al Kindi’s only remaining ambulance – and the other 
three had been stolen or looted – had disappeared. So the dangerously ill 
Mr Khassem was bundled into a clapped-out rust bitten Moskavich 408 
(Blakemore 2009: 12).
(19)  ?? W prezydium Komisji Kultury zasiadał wówczas pan poseł Wełnicki 
– i nie pamiętam imienia – sympatyczny skądinąd człowiek, który swoją 
rolę w tej komisji sprowadzał właściwie do odbijania telewizji publicz-
nej, jak sądził, z jednego ugrupowania do AWS i tym się tylko w czasie 
obrad tej komisji – albo przede wszystkim tym się zajmował.
 ‘Th e Culture Committee was chaired by MP Wełnicki – and I don’t re-
member his fi rst name – a nice man by the way, who actually limited his 
actions to retaking national television, as he thought, from one political 
party to the AWS party and it was the only thing – or the main thing he 
was concerned with.’
A diff erent type of pragmatic integration of the parenthetical and its host is 
shown in Blakemore’s (2009: 11) example given in (20) and the Polish example 
given in (21):
(20) A helicopter, a helicopter – and there was me who’d never even fl own in 
an ordinary plane – would come and pick me up at … 
(21)  W parlamencie podniósł się wielki krzyk ‒ nawet konserwatywnie na-
stawione panie poczuły się urażone, jakby ktoś nazwał je towarem z dru-
giej ręki – więc ostatecznie projektu nie uchwalono.
 ‘An outcry arouse in Parliament – even pro-conservative women MPs 
felt off ended, as if somebody called them second-hand stuff  – so eventu-
ally, the proposed bill was not passed.’
In contrast to the previous examples, it seems that the parentheticals in (20) 
and (21) aff ect the interpretation of the host at the level of implicit communica-
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tion. In particular, it might be proposed that the parenthetical has no relevance 
beyond its eff ect on the interpretation of its host in that it modifi es the context 
for the recovery of the implicit content of the host and contributes, together with 
the host, to the recovery of a single proposition, greater than either of them in-
dividually. Th e parenthetical in the English example encourages the hearer to 
re-consider the contextual assumptions made accessible by the concept of the 
helicopter for the derivation of implicatures which capture the excitement of 
travelling in a helicopter for someone who has never fl own in any kind of plane 
at all (Blakemore 2009: 12). With respect to the Polish example, it can be argued 
that the hearer is expected to revisit the contextual assumptions made accessible 
by the concept wielki krzyk (‘an outcry’) and derive the implicature of MPs’ total 
criticism, as a result of which the proposed bill was not passed.
To see how parentheticals can aff ect the interpretation of their hosts at the 
explicit level, it is necessary to explain the diff erence between explicatures and 
higher-level explicatures introduced into the Relevance Th eory by Sperber 
and Wilson (1995). 
In RT, explicatures are explicitly communicated assumptions, i.e., linguisti-
cally encoded logical forms enriched in such a way as to express determinate 
propositions, as illustrated in (22a):
(22)  a. Johni is at home.
 b. Ann is saying that Johni is at home.
 c. Ann is asserting that Johni is at home.
 d. Ann thinks that Johni is at home. 
Optionally, the proposition may be embedded under a higher-level descrip-
tion: a speech-act description (22b) or a propositional attitude description 
((22c) and (22d)). As such, they are referred to by Wilson and Sperber (1993) 
as higher-level explicatures. Higher-level explicatures, like logical forms and 
fully propositional forms are conceptual representations recovered by a com-
bination of decoding and inference (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 11). While to 
obtain (22a) the hearer must decode the semantic representation of the utter-
ance, to obtain the higher-level explicatures in (22b)‒(22d) the hearer must 
make additional inferences about the speaker’s attitude to the proposition that 
is being expressed and the type of speech-act that is being performed. Th is is 
because both explicatures and higher-level explicatures have their own truth 
conditions and, therefore, are capable of being true in their own right. Only 
the proposition expressed, however, contributes to the truth conditions of the 
associated utterance. Th e higher-level explicature will not be part of the truth-
conditional content of the host utterance.
In view of this, the parentheticals illustrated in (23) and (24) might be said 
to aff ect the interpretation of the host at the level of explicit content. Th ey 
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might be said to contribute to higher-level explicatures; in other words, their 
relevance is in the eff ect they have on the hearer’s understanding of the degree 
of commitment being communicated by the host. 
(23)  What is obvious – and we have eye-witness reports – is that they were 
killed (Blakemore 2009: 11).
(24)  Tak się akurat składa, że owe wszystkie informacje czerpię z tych samych, 
lub jak przypuszczam, chyba tych samych, źródeł, jak mój adwersarz.
 ‘It seems that I obtain all the information from the same, or at least I’m 
assuming that they are the same sources, as my opponent does.’
In (23), the hearer is intended to recover a higher-level explicature con-
veying a greater degree of commitment to the proposition expressed than any 
higher-level explicature possible to be recovered otherwise, in (24), on the 
other hand, the hearer is intended to recover a higher-level explicature which 
conveys less certainty towards the truth of the proposition expressed (Blake-
more 2009: 13‒14).
In (25) shown below, the parenthetical contributes explicitly to the inter-
pretation of the host as well, but this time, by specifying how the quantifi er 
‘każdy’ (‘every’) and its reference should be identifi ed. Th us, it enables the 
hearer to make hypotheses about the relevance of the information communi-
cated by the host. In particular, it appears that the parenthetical specifi es how 
its domain should be interpreted. 
(25)  Każdy przedsiębiorca spełniający warunki, to znaczy ten, kto poniesie 
nakłady inwestycyjne nie mniejsze niż 100 000 EUR, będzie mógł tam 
zainwestować.
 ‘Every businessman who will meet the demands, that is the one who will 
invest no less than 100,000 EUR, will be allowed to invest there.’
Further, the parenthetical in (26) may achieve its relevance at the level of 
explicit content of the host by taking part in what may be labeled as on-line 
concept construction (Carston 2002). To begin with, the hearer decodes the 
meaning of ‘przedtem’ (‘before’). Th e parenthetical, on the other hand, will 
communicate the information that will encourage the hearer to use contextual 
assumptions further to recover the concept the speaker wishes to communi-
cate by uttering ‘przedtem’ as the period of three years they lived in Ostrowiec 
aft er leaving Warsaw:
(26)  Przedtem – to znaczy w ciągu trzech lat, które przeżyli w Ostrowcu 
po opuszczeniu Warszawy – mieszkali w śródmieściu, w reprezenta-
cyjnej Alei Trzeciego Maja i w bliskim sąsiedztwie koszar, w których 
stacjonował głośny pułk ułanów ostrowieckich.
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 ‘Before – that is during the three years they spent in Ostrowiec aft er 
leaving Warsaw – they lived in the city centre, in the prestigious Aleja 
Trzeciego Maja and in the close vicinity of the barracks, in which a well-
-known uhlan regiment of Ostrowiec was deployed.’
To sum up, it seems that, contrary to the existing accounts, the discussed 
examples should not be treated as instances of disfl uency or explained in terms 
of interactional principles which require speakers to keep talking (Wichmann 
2001: 189). Rather, as Blakemore (2006, 2009) argues, within a relevance-the-
oretic account, they can be explained in terms of the pursuit of relevance. Fol-
lowing Sperber and Wilson (1995: 204) it might be observed that the fact that 
an utterance is produced and processed over time means that a hearer will be 
able to access some of its constituent concepts, with their associated logical 
and encyclopedic entries, before others. Th is means that certain contextual as-
sumptions will be triggered before others, and that the hearer, who is assuming 
optimal relevance, will use these to construct hypotheses about the speaker’s 
informative intention. In all of the examples discussed above, the use of the 
disrupted structure is consistent with the speaker’s aim of achieving relevance 
for a minimum cost in processing eff ort.
Th is might lead to the preliminary observation that true parentheticals will 
always carry some relevance to the interpretation of the host. It should not be 
assumed, however, that discourse parentheticals are truth-conditional. At the 
same time, though, they are not completely sealed off  from the truth condi-
tions of their hosts. If truth conditions can be roughly understood as “the truth 
conditions of the thought communicated by the host” (Blakemore 2009: 16) 
and this thought is to be recovered from the encoded semantic representation 
by pragmatic inference, it seems that the parenthetical aff ects truth conditions 
at the level of pragmatic interpretation. Th e relevance of parentheticals lies in 
the role they play in the pragmatic enrichment of their hosts and they have no 
relevance beyond this role. 
5. Parenthetical comment clauses: concepts 
or procedures?
5.1. Parenthetical comment clauses: a challenge for syntactic 
and semantic/pragmatic analyses
Having tried to clarify the exact role of pragmatics in the interpretation of 
discourse parentheticals, it will be interesting to see whether the pragmatic 
interpretation of the parentheticals introduced in (4)‒(9) can be captured in 
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similar relevance-theoretic terms. Th ese parentheticals diff er from the ones in 
(1)‒(3) in that they have been treated as grammatical phenomena since, fol-
lowing Espinal’s (1991: 727) observation that
it seems obvious that our knowledge of a natural language also tells us whether 
a given substring that apparently occurs within a syntactic unit is syntactically in-
dependent of the rest of the string or whether it is incorporated into a single phrase 
marker, and that this knowledge should be accounted for by linguistic theory. 
Th e intuition that the grammar generates linguistic structures with em-
bedded parenthetical constituents is shared by many linguists, among others, 
by Taglicht (1996: 195), who claims that grammatical parenthetical phenom-
ena must be distinguished from diversions and intrusions which characterize 
spontaneous discourse and there must be something that justifi es generating 
an utterance with a parenthetical but not the utterance of ‘Come in’ in the 
middle of the sentence when hearing a knock on the door. Th is assumption 
has implications for analyzing parentheticals in linguistic theory. In particu-
lar, accommodating syntactically independent, though linearly ordered par-
entheticals in syntax, in which the notions of precedence and linear order play 
a vital role, has been a considerable challenge. Further, due to their status as 
a syntax/pragmatics phenomenon, it is still debatable whether their proper-
ties stem from their grammar or whether they have a purely pragmatic expla-
nation.
In the middle of this debate come parenthetical comment clauses that seem 
to be central in the description of parentheticals due their syntactic and se-
mantic properties. On the one hand, they are clausal in nature and are taken 
to contain representational meaning, just as discourse parentheticals do; on 
the other, they are argued (e.g., Brinton 2008) to be non-truth conditional, 
phonologically short, procedural pragmatic markers, similar in behavior and 
function to discourse markers. Th us, they seem to be suitable candidates for 
being reinterpreted in terms of conceptual or procedural meaning within a rel-
evance-theoretic framework. 
5.2. Comment clauses in speech-act accounts 
Since the infl uential Urmson’s paper (1952), the verbs ‘think,’ ‘know,’ ‘believe,’ 
‘mean,’ ‘suppose,’ etc. are referred to as parenthetical verbs and treated in the 
traditional speech-act literature as similar to illocutionary or attitudinal ad-
verbs, i.e., indicating the speaker’s degree of commitment to the proposition 
expressed. Illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials do not contribute to the 
truth conditions of the utterances they are embedded in by all standards for 
non-truth conditionality. 
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Similarly, parenthetical comment clauses are argued not to contribute to 
the proposition expressed and since their only function is that of a formula or 
an indicator (Austin 1962) of the performance of the act, they fi t the speech-
act semantics just as other illocutionary force indicators, the above-mentioned 
adverbials or, say, performative verbs.
Th us, on the standard speech-act account, the parenthetical comment 
clauses in (27b)‒(27d) would be considered stylistic variants (‘I think’ is said 
to be loosely attached to the sentence it accompanies and can be reordered) 
that weaken the strength of the assertion expressed in (27a) and give rise to 
complex speech-acts:
(27)  a. John is insane. [stronger]
 b. I think John is insane. [weaker]
 c. John is, I think, insane. [weaker]
 d. John is insane, I think. [weaker]
However, as Ifantidou (1994: 197) observes, if the examples in (27b)‒(27d) 
involve complex speech-acts, i.e., two utterances (the one with the assertion 
and with the comment clause), there is no convincing explanation why each 
one could not have its own truth conditions and the parenthetical comment 
clause should be devoid completely of any descriptive content. 
Further, the equivalent examples from Polish in (28) do not support the 
claim that all the sentences in (27) are stylistic variants. Crucial syntactic dif-
ferences can be immediately noticed in (28a) if compared to (28b)‒(28c): 
(28)  a. Sądzę, że Jan jest szalony.
 b. Jan jest, jak sądzę, szalony.
 c. Jan jest szalony, jak sądzę.
Th e fi rst sentence cannot be taken to contain a true, syntactically uninte-
grated parenthetical, since its syntactic representation would be that of a com-
plex sentence with a transitive verb in the main clause followed by an object 
which is a subordinate clause introduced by the complementizer ‘that.’ 
Moreover, ‘I think’ in (27b) is truth-conditional. Th is can be supported by 
applying a truth-conditionality test, i.e., embedding the sentence with the ex-
pression to be tested into a conditional and seeing if this expression falls within 
the scope of ‘if ’ (Ifantidou 1994: 198):
(29)  If I think John is insane, he will not be arraigned or tried.
Th e question is, as Ifantidou (1994: 199) formulates it, under what cir-
cumstances the speaker is claiming that John will not be arraigned or tried. If 




(30)  If John is insane, he will not be arraigned or tried. 
However, the two sentences are not synonymous. ‘I think’ does fall within 
the scope of ‘if ’ and is truth-conditional. 
True parentheticals (i.e., stylistic variants, with the parenthetical comment 
clause in the sentence-initial, mid-sentence and sentence-fi nal position) are il-
lustrated by the English examples in (31) and their Polish counterparts in (32), 
respectively:
(31)  a. I think, John is insane.
 b. John is, I think, insane.
 c. John is insane, I think.
(32) a. Jak sądzę, Jan jest szalony.
 b. Jan jest, jak sądzę, szalony.
 c. Jan jest szalony, jak sądzę.
Th e truth-conditional tests confi rm this claim (irrespective of the position 
of jak sądzę ‘I think’ within the sentence). In the example (33) below, jak sądzę 
‘I think’ does not fall under the scope of ‘if ’ and, in consequence, proves to be 
non-truth conditional:
(33) Jeśli Jan jest, jak sądzę, szalony, nie będzie oskarżony ani sądzony. (= (34))
(34) Jeśli Jan jest szalony, nie będzie oskarżony ani sądzony.
Moreover, parenthetical comment clauses seem to take the whole utterance 
in their scope (both in the English and the Polish examples below):
(35) If John is insane, he will not be arraigned or tried, I think.
(36) Jeśli Jan jest szalony, nie będzie oskarżony ani sądzony, jak sądzę.
5.3. Parenthetical comment clauses in a relevance-theoretic 
account: how do comment clauses comment?
Given the distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning that ex-
pressions in a natural language may encode, the question that arises is whether 
parenthetical comment clauses fall on the conceptual side of this distinction, 
i.e., whether they encode constituents of conceptual representations and are 
similar to discourse parentheticals in this respect or whether they are proce-
dural, i.e., whether they show how the associated utterances should be infer-
entially processed. 
As argued by Rouchota (1998), expressions that encode procedural mean-
ing can be expected to exhibit properties indicative of their non-conceptual 
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status. Th eir meaning should be relatively diffi  cult to bring to conscious aware-
ness; such expressions also should not combine with other expressions to form 
expressions of greater semantic complexity in the way conceptual expressions 
do. Procedural expressions also should not be subject to relations of entailment 
or contradiction. Conceptual expressions, by contrast, have phonetic and syn-
tactic representations and concepts as their constituents. Besides, they can en-
ter into logical relations such as contradiction or entailment; they can describe 
or partially characterize a certain state of aff airs, they can be true or false, and 
they can act as input to inference rules.
Th e speaker using a parenthetical can be accused of making an untruthful 
claim (Ifantidou 1994: 202):
(37)  A:  John is waiting at the airport, I think.
 B:  Th at’s not true; you don’t think anything of the sort.
(38)  A:  Krytyk literacki nie mógłby, jak sądzę, zasnąć po lekturze tych 
     wierszy.
     ‘A literary critic wouldn’t be able, I think, to fall asleep aft er reading
     these poems.’
 B: Nieprawda, nie sądzisz tak wcale.
      ‘Th at’s not true, you don’t think so.’
Examples like the above thus suggest that although comment parentheti-
cals do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they 
are embedded, they can be true or false in their own right, which implies that 
they encode concepts.
Th e next argument for the conceptual status of parentheticals is their po-
tential compositionality: they can have a complex syntactic and semantic 
structure:
(39)  John is, I increasingly tend to think, a fool.
(40)  Th is is, I strongly suspect, despite all indications to the contrary, a Tinto-
retto.
(41)  I sądzę, że właśnie ta trudność sprawiła ‒ tak przynajmniej sądzę ‒ że 
trzeba było w tekście sprawozdania słowo zmienić.
 ‘And I think that this particular diffi  culty – at least I think so – led to the 
necessary change of the word in the report content.’
(42)  Warszawa kojarzyła mi się z zimą, a Sulejówek z latem, które, jak wtedy 
sądziłem, trwa tu także zimą.
 ‘I associated Warsaw with winter, whereas Sulejówek with summer, 
which, I thought at that time, lasted there during winter as well.’
As Ifantidou (1994, 2001) argues, the parentheticals in the utterances (39) 
and (40) above seem to encode concepts, which are capable of undergoing 
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regular compositional semantic rules. It is not clear how they can be analyzed 
in procedural terms. 
As shown in the previous section, discourse parentheticals may contribute 
to the pragmatic interpretation of an utterance at diff erent levels: implicit or 
explicit.
Ifantidou (1994, 2001), following Wilson and Sperber (1993), argues that 
true parentheticals, comment clauses included, contribute to the explicit aspect 
of communication as well. If explicatures are taken to be explicitly communi-
cated assumptions of an utterance and may include the proposition expressed 
by this utterance and higher-level descriptions obtained by optionally embed-
d-ing this proposition under a speech-act verb or a propositional-attitude verb, 
then it might be proposed that parenthetical comment clauses can be analyzed 
as providing the hearer with explicit guidance as to the intended higher-level 
explicature. To obtain the higher-level explicatures the hearer must make ad-
ditional inferences about the speaker’s attitude to the proposition and the type 
of speech-act the speaker is performing and the greater the degree of decoding 
involved, the more explicit the communication (Ifantidou 1994: 204).
Th us within the RT framework, the fact that parentheticals encode con-
cepts, though they are non-truth conditional, can be captured since higher-
-level explicatures may contribute conceptual representations (truth-condi-
tional in their own right) recovered by a combination of decoding and infer-
ence. For example, in (43) the parenthetical ‘I think’ is non-truth conditional 
and it can be taken to provide the hearer with explicit guidance as to the in-
tended higher-level explicature in (44) (Ifantidou 1994: 204):
(43)  John is, I think, at the airport.
(44)  Mary thinks John is at the airport.
However, as Ifantidou (1994) notes, the problem with this analysis is that 
it assigns the same propositional structure to true parentheticals and their 
main-clause counterparts. It appears then that true parentheticals encode the 
same conceptual information as main-clauses and the claim that the addi-
tion of a comment clause sentence-initial, mid-sentence and sentence-fi nal to 
achieve a specifi c pragmatic eff ect to weaken or strengthen the assertion is not 
accounted for. 
One solution (Ifantidou 1994, 2001) is to treat the host and the parenthet-
ical comment clause as two utterances, two separate speech-acts, one com-
menting on the other, just as in the case of discourse parentheticals discussed 
in the fi rst section. Th is analysis might be supported by the accounts in which 
parenthetical expressions are taken to be phonologically, syntactically and se-
mantically independent of their hosts. On this approach, (43) would assert that 
John is at the airport and that the speaker thinks that John is at the airport, 
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with the main point of the utterance being made by the most deeply embedded 
assertion (Ifantidou 1994: 206). Th us, intuitions about the truth conditions of 
the parenthetical in (43) are intuitions about the subpart that makes the major 
contribution to overall relevance, which constitutes its main point. 
Further, the fact that parentheticals express a diminished commitment to 
the proposition expressed follows from the semantics of the constructions to-
gether with considerations of optimal relevance provided in (45) from Ifanti-
dou (1994: 206).
(45)  An utterance, on a given interpretation, is optimally relevant if: 
 a.  it achieves enough contextual eff ects to be worth the hearer’s attention;
b.  it puts the hearer to no unjustifi able processing eff ort in achieving 
those eff ects.
Th e very fact of requesting the hearer’s attention by means of an utterance 
creates in him an expectation of optimal relevance. By the condition speci-
fi ed in (45a), the utterance is expected to yield more eff ects than any other 
information the hearer could have been attending to at the time. According to 
the condition in (45b), the speaker who wants to eliminate any risk of being 
misunderstood, should make the intended interpretation as easy to recover as 
possible. 
According to the defi nition of optimal relevance, the extra processing eff ort 
incurred by the parenthetical construction ‘I think’ needs to be off set by extra 
or diff erent contextual eff ects, which in this case, is a diminished commitment 
to the proposition expressed. Where the parenthetical is ‘I know,’ the extra con-
textual eff ect would oft en be a strengthened commitment to the proposition 
expressed. If the speaker wanted to communicate a strong assertion, she would 
have done so and would have spared the unnecessary eff ort and avoided a mis-
understanding. 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, I have looked at the semantic/discourse properties of paren-
theticals from a relevance-theoretic perspective, which takes the pragmatic ef-
fects parenthetical phenomena contribute to utterance interpretation to follow 
from the considerations of optimal relevance. However, if the explanations RT 
off ers are to be convincing, some further questions need to be answered and 
additional work needs to be done. For example, in a recent paper, Kaltenböck 
(2008) investigates the communicative uses of parenthetical comment clauses 
in a corpus of spoken English and establishes a link between prosodic proper-
ties of parentheticals and diff erent pragmatic functions they may have. Specifi -
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cally, he argues that lack of prosodic independence (i.e., comma intonation) of 
a parenthetical element can suggest a diff erent communicative use, i.e., a tex-
tual function that can be a result of continuous semantic bleaching and repre-
sent diff erent stages in an ongoing grammaticalisation (or pragmaticalization) 
process. As structuring devices, these comment clauses have little semantic 
content, they help the speaker to overcome production diffi  culties and main-
tain fl uency, and the hearer to signal what belongs together and to structure 
the information fl ow. Comment clauses that have an epistemic relationship to 
the proposition they modify, on the other hand, would be mostly prosodically 
independent of the phrase to which they are attached.6 
It remains to be seen in future research if similar observations on the rela-
tion between the individual prosodic patterns of comment clauses and their 
contribution to interpretation in discourse are universal and carry over to 
other languages. 
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